


Introduction

Classic IT security context: main goals are **security policy** definition (in terms of confidentiality/integrity), its enforcement (malicious content filtering, isolation...) and its **monitoring** (intrusion detection, vulnerability analysis). DIFC (**Dynamic Information Flow Control**) is an approach aiming to ensure that security properties are preserved all along the execution and files storage.



Containers of information: files, variables... Labels (also known as **tags**) are attached to such containers. Information flow policy \Rightarrow relation between tags.

Software-Based DIFC


Analysis can be done at the operating system and application levels:

- ▶ **OS-level:** dedicated OS or modification of existing OS.
 - ✓ Small overhead (< 10%).
 - ✗ Overapproximation issue.
- ▶ **Application-level:** machine code or specific language.
 - ✓ Gain in precision (hybrid analysis).
 - ✗ Huge overhead (> $\times 3$ at least!).


Goals

- ▶ Modify existing hardware to **accelerate** IFC and **protect** tags.
- ▶ **Compatibility** with existing software/hardware.
- ▶ Design of a **flexible solution** (no dependency with policy or tag format).


Existing Hardware-Assisted Approaches



[1] In-core DIFT



[2] Offloading DIFT




[3] Off-core DIFT

- ✓ Minimal impact on speed
- ✗ Tag propagation in core pipeline + not portable
- ✓ Separate processor for DIFC controls + tag compression/decompression
- ✗ Inter-core logic + power consumption $\times 2$
- ✓ Dedicated co-processor + nearly no modification of the main processor
- ✗ Main core may stall

Source: Hari Kannan, *Building Hardware Systems for Information Flow Tracking*, PhD defense (2010). http://cs1.stanford.edu/~christos/publications/2010.hari_kannan_phd_thesis_slides.pdf

HardBlare Approach



HardBlare targets **heterogeneous SoCs** combining a hardcore processor based on the **ARMv7** architecture with a **FPGA** (Zynq from Xilinx, SoC from Altera).

Main processor must send a **tuple** composed of the following elements:

- ▶ Instruction pointer (i.e. program counter).
- ▶ Instruction encoding (fine-grained level).
- ▶ Memory addresses and processed registers (in case of load/store instructions).

As we cannot modify the ARM chip, how can we get the needed information from the main processor ?

- ▶ A **trace mechanism** should help to perform DIFC controls.
- ▶ Processor/coprocessor **synchronization**:
 - ▶ Performed on system calls (a few hundred cycles).
 - ▶ Synchronization time overhead: around ten cycles.

\Rightarrow **Evaluation** in terms of **performances** and **security** on a full-fledged Linux system with standard binaries.

Source: Xilinx Inc., *Zynq-7000 All Programmable SoC, Technical Reference Manual* (2015). http://www.xilinx.com/support/documentation/user_guides/ug585-Zynq-7000-TRM.pdf

Some References

- [1] M. Dalton, H. Kannan, and C. Kozyrakis, "Raksha: A flexible information flow architecture for software security," in *International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA)*, 2007.
- [2] V. Nagarajan, H.-S. Kim, Y. Wu, and R. Gupta, "Dynamic information tracking on multicores," in *12th Workshop on the Interaction between Compilers and Computer Architecture (INTERACT)*, Feb 2008.
- [3] H. Kannan, M. Dalton, and C. Kozyrakis, "Decoupling dynamic information flow tracking with a dedicated coprocessor," in *Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, DSN 2009, Estoril, Lisbon, Portugal, June 29 - July 2, 2009*, pp. 105-114, 2009.
- [4] G. Venkataramani, I. Doudalis, Y. Solihin, and M. Prvulovic, "Flexitaint: A programmable accelerator for dynamic taint propagation," in *14th International Symposium on High-Performance Computer Architecture (HPCA-14)*, 2008.

Main Contributions at a Glance

- ▶ Hardware-assisted DIFC system with limited time overheads.
- ▶ Approach based on a non-modified CPU with a standard Linux and generic binaries \Rightarrow Could be implemented by industrial partners in medium-term.
- ▶ Hardened with hardware security mechanisms: trusted coprocessor storage and bus protection in terms of confidentiality/integrity.
- ▶ Contributions on software-related issues as well (static/dynamic IFC analysis, aka hybrid analysis).
- ▶ Perspectives on runtime reconfiguration and multicore/manycore systems.