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Conference Papers Year : 2010

On the Fictitious Play and Channel Selection Games


Considering the interaction through mutual interference of the different radio devices, the channel selection (CS) problem in decentralized parallel multiple access channels can be modeled by strategic-form games. Here, we show that the CS problem is a potential game (PG) and thus the fictitious play (FP) converges to a Nash equilibrium (NE) either in pure or mixed strategies. Using a 2−player 2−channel game, it is shown that a convergence in mixed strategies might lead to cycles of action profiles which lead to individual spectral efficiencies (SE) which are worse than the SE at the worst NE in mixed and pure strategies. Finally, exploiting the fact that the CS problem is a PG and an aggregation game, we present a method to implement FP with milder information conditions than those required in its original version.
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hal-00556152 , version 1 (15-01-2011)


  • HAL Id : hal-00556152 , version 1


Samir M. Perlaza, Hamidou Tembine, Samson Lasaulce, Victor Quintero Florez. On the Fictitious Play and Channel Selection Games. LATINCOM 2010, Sep 2010, Colombia. 6 p. ⟨hal-00556152⟩
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